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by Francis A. Allen
Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law
The University of Michigan Law School
[This article is based on the Louis Caplan Lecture delivered
by Prof. Allen on April 10, 1981, at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. The full text of the lecture, and
accompanying footnotes, will be published in the
Pittsburgh Law Review.]

In moments of exasperation , one ma y b e te mpt ed to
misapply Mark Twain 's comment about the weather and
complain that everyone talks about criminal justice , _bu t no
one does anything about it. Sober second though t qmckl y
reveals, however , that the statement is not literall y or even
substantially true . Since the eighteenth-century
Enlightenment much has been done , for good or ill , about
the criminal law and penal justice . Capital punishment was
notably curtailed in the western world, and a regime of
prisons, reformatories , and other so-called secondary
punishments was instituted . Hopes for rehabilitation of
offenders soared in the nineteenth century , and the
rehabilitative ideal dominated thought in our own era . Such
products of penal rehabilitationism as the juvenile court ,
systems of probation and parole, and the indeterminate
sentence recommended themselves to American legislators
and, indeed , to lawmakers throughout western civilization .
Then in the 1970s American allegiance tu the rehabilitative
ideal precipitously declined , and we find ourselves toda y
searching for a new intellectual blue print or paradigm to
guide thought and policy for the remainder of the century.
The substantive criminal law itself has expanded
enormously, and today expresses an extraordinary range of
purposes including not only that of minimizing violent
behavior threatening to lives and property , but also the
regulation of economic enterprise ; protection of the
environment ; correction of relations among races and
genders ; alteration in habits of consumption of liquor ,
drugs , and sex ; and even compliance with legislative
dictates concerning times at which clocks are to be set.
Many years ago I wrote that "the system of criminal justice
ma be viewed as a weary Atlas upon whose shoulders we
have heaped a crushing burden of responsibilities relating
to public policy in its various aspects . This we have done
thoughtlessly without inquiring whether the burden can be
effectively borne ." The statement is a little flamboyant, as
perhaps befits youth; but stripped of metaphor it seems
accurate enough .
The questions about the criminal law that I propose to
address in these remarks are in no sense new. They relate
to the propriety of criminal sanctions as devices to achieve
certain social ends . Propriety, as I am using the term , refers
to the effectiveness of the criminal sanction in achieving
given social purposes , but also to its capacity to gain social
ends without imperiling or destroying other important
values in the process. Questions about the propriety of
criminal sanctions in this dual sense arise whenever serious
thought is directed to legal regulation of human behavior.
Morea er, the questions are never answered fully or for all
time . They recur as social purposes change , as the social
context alters, and as basic values relating to the relations
of individuals and groups to state power are redefined .
The reasons for the persistence of questions surrounding
the use of criminal sanctions become clearer when one
considers some of the characteristics of the criminal law .
First , the criminal law is the heav artillery of societ . If
regimes of political terror of the sort that accompanied the
emergence of totalitarian societies in the present century
are removed from consideration , nowhere will one
encounter such extreme exercises of state power within the
confines of domestic policy as those occurring regular! in
the ordinary administration of criminal justice . Under the
authority of the criminal law a society may deprive its
members of their propert , liberty, and lives ; and all
societies, in fact , do many of these things almost routine!
The ver weight of criminal sanctions requires societies
valuing individual volition to erect principles of
containment in order that the powers of go vernment
employed in law enforcement ma be pre ented from
overreaching their bounds and destro ing or impairing
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basic political values . That the s stem of penal sanctions is
capable of being utilized to ravage the institutions of liberal
societies is another of the lessons to be learned from the
history of totalitarian dictatorships in the twentieth century.
The weight of criminal sanctions creates other important
problems, some of them of a less apocalyptic sort. The
severity of such penalties often makes them
disproportionate to the purposes for which they are
emplo ed . To borrow an idiom from Sir Leslie (now Lord)
Scarman , we ought not to "use ... a nuclear weapon to
control a street riot. " When overly severe penalties are
authorized, one of two consequences may follow . First, the
sanction may be applied with the result that
disproportionate injuries are inflicted on the offender. This
is the problem of overkill. Second, the mismatch of penalty
and offense may be so apparent to those who administer
criminal justice that they may be induced to withhold
penalties in situations in which sanctions of some sort are
required . This is the problem of nullification .
It is true , of course , that there is a great range of severity
in the penalties administered by modern systems of
criminal justice, extending from little more than
admonitions to the infliction of capital punishment. It is also
true that alternative civil penalties, such as license
revocation , may fall with greater economic effect on the
off ender than a fine or even a short period of
imprisonment; for the withdrawal of the license may
deprive the offender of a livelihood for himself and his
family. Altogether too little attention has been given to the
impact of such "civil" sanctions, and perhaps too great
significance has been attached to the "criminal" or "noncriminal" forms of the penalties. Nevertheless, there is one
feature of even apparently mild criminal sanctions that
enhances their weight. The criminal law deals in the
allocation of stigma; it dispenses social moral
condemnation. Much of the effectiveness and also the
destructiveness of criminal sanctions are related to this
fact.
Another characteristic of the criminal law that inhibits
rational policy is the very accessibility of penal sanctions.
Like the mountaineer's mountain, the system of criminal
justice is there . Criminal courts hold session in every
county seat. It is much easier for legislators to supply
criminal penalties than it is to inquire whether such
sanctions are appropriate ih a given regulatory situation
and, if so , of what type, or whether there are alternative
civil sanctions more likely to achieve the legislative
purpose and at less social cost. The insouciance of
lawmakers approaching these questions is illustrated by a
story. When the principal draftsman of a major piece of
New Deal legislation was asked about the presence of
criminal penalties in the bill, he answered : "I don't know.
They got into the draft late one Saturday afternoon."
There is one further characteristic of the criminal law
that discourages sober consideration of the propriety of
criminal sanctions in the multitude of circumstances in
which they are employed . Criminal sanctions are means to
the accomplishment of social goals; they are not ends in
themselves . There is a morality of ends and a morality of
means . The morality of ends concerns itself with what goals
are to be pursued through the utilization of state power. The
morality of means is concerned with the propriety-the
effectiveness and decency-of devices proposed to achieve
social objectives. In our society many more persons are
concerned with the morality of ends than of means. Fierce
conflicts surround the selection of governmental objectives,
contentions all the more acute since the elections of
November, 1980. Typically, persons strongly committed to
particular social goals think little about the propriety of the
means proposed ; many lack either the capacity or
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inclination to do so . Ind d, many such apostl s of th
moralit of ends int rpr t qu estions about m an as
evidences of covert ho tili t on the part of thos who po e
them . After all, who can doubt that food sold in th e
marketplace should be pure, drugs should b properly
labelled, our air and water unpolluted, family members
free from parental or spousal violence, our soci ty rid of
racial and se ual discrimination? With such interests at
stake, who can in good faith quibble about means? The
tendenc to disregard or slight the morality of means, which
is alwa s strong, has been rendered even more formidible
b recent developments in our political life . More and
more , American public policy is being influenced by
organized groups that gain potency by restricting their
interests to single issues or single groups of issues, and
display neither knowledge nor concern abou I any other part
of the polity. Groups that achieve a tenuous coherence
through advancing single narrow ends are little inclined to
re-examine the methods proposed . The morality of means
does not flourish in an era of single-issue politics .
Yet the claims of the morality of means are insistent, and
at no time more so than when criminal sanctions are
contemplated . The central proposition relating to the use of
criminal sanctions with which I shall be concerned here, is
that the criminal law ought not to make unwise and
counterproductive interventions; it ought not, that is, to
undertake punitively what in fact cannot be accomplished
or cannot be accomplished without doing more harm than
good or without incurring unnecessary social costs. Such
broad aspirations cannot be codified in the form of crisp
commands to the legislature. This is true because in any
given area of regulation views are likely to differ in
advance of legislation about what is wise or can be
achieved or where the balance of benefit lies. The matter is
by its nature very much one of trial and error . Yet although
it may often be impossible to prescribe wisdom in advance,
there is no justification for ignoring what may be learned
from past experience and past failures . Unhappily,
legislative practice in the penal area is not characterized by
earnest scrutiny of why past attempts failed , or even by
efforts to learn which attempts failed or succeeded . What is
most disheartening is not that the same mistakes are
repeated, but rather the unawareness of many lawmakers,
legislative and judicial, that mistakes are being made .
In the remarks that follow, I shall identify some areas of
penal interest in which pressing concerns of the morality of
means arise. I shall briefly inquire into how the claims of
that morality have been flouted and what may be required
to honor them ... .
A decision by a society to impose criminal sanctions in
any area of human activity inevitably entails consequences,
some of them going much beyond the intended lawenforcement objectives. The chronic failure of lawmakers
to concern themselves with such consequences and to
perceive that social costs may vary significantly from one
area of penal regulation to another, constitutes a serious
obstacle to the attainment of rational penal policy. Without
a sensitive awareness of likely consequences, legislative
consideration of the appropriateness of proposed
interventions by the criminal justice system into the lives of
persons is likely to be meager and of limited relevance.
These points can perhaps be illustrated most readily by
reference to American experience with the so-called
victimless crimes-offenses involving such acts as the
possession and use of liquor and drugs, prostitution, and
gambling. Many of the most important effects of such
legislation stem from the fact that what is being
criminalized is conduct typically performed privately or
secretly.

In order to discover whether crimes are being committed
and to identify the violators , law enforcement must
impinge heavily on constitutionall y protected zones of
privacy . It is no accident that for practical purposes the law
of the Fourth Amendment begins not in 1791 when the
amendment was first included in the Bill of Rights, but
rather with the Prohibition Experiment in the twentieth
century . The law of search and seizure has ever since been
nourished and expanded most importantly by police
activity associated with the sumptuary offenses . Nor can it
be doubted that the practical difficulties encountered by
law enforcement in these areas have induced courts to
relax constitutional restraints on police powers . The ease
with which the Supreme Court validated the use of hearsay
evidence to establish "probable cause " for arrest and
search reflects this pressure , as does the Court 's persistent
sanctioning of undercover informants and police spies in
American criminal justice , despite the moral incongruities
and abuses that such resort admittedly entails . In short, the
decision to criminalize behavior in these areas has resulted
in significant redefinitions of the relations of individual
right to governmental power .

The spector of the policeman in the
bedroom-and a federal policeman at
that-may rise to menace us once
again.
The victimless crime area is familiar territory;
observations of the sort just made have long been familiar
to criminal lawyers and social commentators. Another area
of penal regulation is emerging, however , with problems of
comparable seriousness that have received much less
attention in the literature of criminal justice. The area to
which I refer is that in which efforts are made to order and
regulate behavior in the family setting and in other intimate
relationships through the use of criminal sanctions. It is not
entirely fanciful to assert that the problems of achieving
rational penal policy in these fields are rendered unusuall
difficult by a conflict between what I have called the
morality of ends and the morality of means, between
intensely desired objectives and circumstances tending to
frustrate their achievement and to distort their effects .
These are important and complex issues, and only their
broad outlines can be sketched in these remarks.
Among the most typical, strongly held, and important
aspirations of persons living in the late twentieth century
are those seeking the security of women and children
against violence in the home and the enhancement of the
scope and dignity of women's roles in the larger societ .
Clearly related, also , are the contradictor objectives of
those caught up in the abortion controversy, a controversy
more threatening to the viability of American pluralism
than almost any other in these times . Given objectives so
fervently held and, in many instances, so obviously just, one
must expect that the recruitment of all possible means to
achieve these goals will be strongly advocated and that
criminal sanctions will be prominent among those
proposed . It would seem likely, also, that criminal
condemnation of private behavior antagonistic to such goals
will take on a symbolic significance that may at times
interfere with rational utilitarian calculation. It is my
modest proposition that the claims of the morality of means
now require increased attention in these areas.
The nature of these problems makes dogmatism
especially inappropriate. It cannot be asserted, for

example , that criminal sanctions have no proper role to
play. So long as the policy objectives include the
suppression of violent physical assaults, criminal penalties
must be available , however assiduously alternative
methods are pursued . Moreover, in some areas criminal
sanctions appeal to be the most effective devices available .
Thus a recent study persuasively and somewhat
disconcertingly demonstrates that the threat and
application of criminal sanctions may constitute the best
means to hold deserving fathers to their legal obligations of
child support.
Yet one attempting to think seriously about the problems
of sanctions in these fields is likely soon to become sensitive
to the fact that this is an area in which unanticipated
consequences abound, in which the devices employed to
achieve policy objectives frequently prove ineffective and
counter-productive, in which the social costs of penal
interventions are sometimes very high. Suspicions that the
dynamics of intimate family relations create a peculiarly
difficult milieu for penal regulation may be raised in the
first instance by discovery of the fact that more policemen
are injured while intervening in violent disputes between
husband and wife or other family members than in the
performance of any other law-enforcement function . One
important reason for the high police casualty rates is that
often the warring family members temporarily suspend
hostilities between themselves and give expression to their
mutual misery and frustration by attacking the intruding
representatives of law and order . Obviously, despite the
perils , the police cannot ignore disputes that disturb the
peace and threaten life and limb; but across the country
serious efforts are being made to substitute mediative and
conciliatory interventions for those of the more punitive
and authoritarian sort.
Some strands of the evolving penal policy in these fields
deserve to be greeted with considerable skepticism . That
the dignity, not to say the physical integrity, of women
requires that they not be forced violently and against their
will into sexual relations with their husbands in the home
as well as with strangers in the street, is a proposition
deserving of unqualified acceptance in contemporary
society. There is abundant evidence, however, that forced
relations occur in many American homes. Yet when one
moves from acceptance of the principle and the fact of its
widespread violation to the problem of appropriate official
response , it by no means follows that we should, as some
states have done, redefine the crime of forcible rape to
include forced relations between a husband and wife living
together . Nor is such an alteration of the law of rape
mandated simply by the fact that the reasons traditionally
given in judicial opinions for excluding wives from the
crime's definition are inadequate and offensive . There is
need for more serious consideration than has apparently
yet been given to such questions as whether any increment
of deterrence is gained from prosecutions of husbands for
rape rather than for assault , and whether such
enhancement of stigma and penalties threatens
nullification and hence reduced rather than enlarged
protection of married women. No doubt, other inquiries
need also to be pursued .
When one moves to the abortion controversy, the
prospects become even more somber and threatening. In
recent years Ii terally scores of proposed resolutions calling
for a "Right To Life" amendment to the United States
Constitution have been introduced in Congress. Although
the language of these proposals varies somewhat in content
and legal sophistication, they typically direct that "no
unborn person shall be deprived of life by any person ." The
fetus is defined to be a person from the moment of
fertilization, and full enforcement powers are conferred on
Congress and the state legislatures. The implications of
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these proposals are broad and sobering; no adequate
canvass of them can be given here. It wil1 be noted that the
prohibitory language apparently encompasses not only
abortions as that term is ordinarily understood, but also
some forms of birth control. If such an amendment is
approved and ratified, the passage of implementing
criminal legislation, some of it congressional, seems
ine itable. The spector of the policeman in the bedroomand a federal policeman at that-which we thought had
been put to rest b such cases as Griswold v . Connecticut,
ma rise to menace us again.
Definition of the proper role of criminal sanctions in the
famil and in other intimate relationships encompasses
some of the most difficult and neglected issues in modern
criminal justice . The neglect is not entirely surprising.
These are areas in which basic policy orientations have
been in contention and dispute. The claims of the morality
of means are often unheard when strong feelings are
aroused in battles over fundamental objectives. Yet sooner
or later the problems of consequences and means must be
addressed . Sound policy demands more than reflexive
resort to criminal sanctions because they are there, or
merely because of the symbolism of criminal
condemnation . Sophistication about the use and application
of sanctions is required both in order to achieve policy
objectives more effectively and also to avoid damaging the
fabric of our basic political values upon which hopes for the
next half century rest.
The concerns of the morality of means are not limited to
questions about the appropriateness of penal interventions
into various areas of human activity or those relating to the
proper definitions of criminal offenses . There remain the
difficult and important problems of what the system of
criminal justice is to do with offenders once they have been
convicted. These are questions of extraordinary scope and
complexity. Indeed, the problems of correctional treatment
have long been a principal focus of American
criminological thought. Certain of these issues have gained
a new urgency in the closing years of the twentieth century.
As was mentioned in the opening comments, the 1970s
were marked by the precipitous decline of allegiance to
the rehabilitative ideal. Although the purpose of
rehabilitating convicted offenders has never been given full
and consistent expression in the actual practice of
American corrections, to a remarkable degree the ideal of
rehabilitation served as a widely shared aspiration for the
penal s stem during the larger part of the present century
and as a standard for measuring the performance of
criminal justice. The reasons for the decline in allegiance to
penal rehabilitationism in the decade just past are many
and complex, and cannot be examined here . For present
purposes it may be sufficient to say that the decline has
made the construction of a new theoretical pattern or
paradigm one of the primary obligations of those concerned
with American penal policy . It has also posed the issue of
what role, if any, rehabilitative efforts in and out of the
prisons are to play in the future .
Since the second world war, and even before, a
comprehensive critique of the rehabilitative ideal has
emerged . The critique not only casts doubt on our capacities
to alter the criminal propensities of convicted offenders,
but also warns that in some of its manifestations penal
rehabilitationism imperils the central values of liberal
societies . Mature consideration has led some observers to
the conclusion that such deleterious social consequences
flow, not from the mere presence of rehabilitative programs
in penal institutions, but primarily from the role that
rehabilitation has been accorded in American corrections.
In short , it is suggested that a range of pernicious and
unintended consequences arise when rehabilitation is

28

made the purpose of penal treatment rather than a means
by which the self-improvement and self-realization of
convicted offenders can be facilitated. If rehabilitation is
thought to be the purpose of institutional programs, then the
success or failure of penal institutions will be measured by
whether the reform of off enders is achieved. Because such
changes in criminal proclivities are hard to come by and
because a penal system must necessarily serve many
purposes other than inmate reform, a strong tendency
develops among correctional personnel to exaggerate
grossly their rehabilitative achievements and to pretend
that much of what is being done for entirely other purposes
is motivated by rehabilitative ends. For their part, prisoners
being held under indeterminate sentences quickly perceive
that their release dates depend upon their giving evidences
of reform; and not surprisingly, many set avidly to work to
provide such evidences . As many commentators have
remarked, the prisons are converted into great schools for
thespians. Because typically the goals and methods of the
rehabilitative effort are imposed upon rather than chosen
by the inmates, the effectiveness of the effort is minimal.

At a time . .. when we are being invited
to redefine our social objectives, it is of
importance to give particular attention
to how we propose to achieve them.

With these considerations in view, commentators such as
Professor Norval Morris have urged that rehabilitative
programs should be regarded as facilitative rather than
coercive. Persons should be sentenced to prison, not to be
reformed, but rather because such punishment represents
just deserts for their crimes or is required to deter the
prisoners and others from committing similar crimes in the
future . Educational, vocational, and therapeutic programs
should be made available to prisoners desiring them, but
their participation in them is not to be compelled nor should
their release dates be determined by administrative
findings that they have been reformed. The pragmatic
advantages anticipated from this recasting of the penal
rehabilitative effort are clear. Because the rehabilitative
goal is one voluntarily assumed by the prisoner and the
program of self-improvement freely entered into, it is
hoped that institutional correctional programs will more
successfully achieve their rehabilitative ends than in the
past. The penal institution is relieved of the often
impossible obligation of reforming the irredeemable and
the parole board of the often equally impossible task of
determining when the prisoner has been reformed and
eligible for release.
The proposal for redefinition of rehabilitative effort in
the penal system is thus one based on the principle of
inmate voluntarism. It has been defended primarily as a
means to eliminate or reduce the factors that frequently in
the past rendered rehabilitative regimes ineffective and
sometimes malignant. The principle of voluntarism in
prisons, however, may possess an even broader
significance. It may be identified, that is, as expressing a
basic assumption of public morality applicable to a wide
range of public issues, as occupying a central position in the
morality of means. It seems responsible to assert that the
1980 e lections, portentous as they may prove to be, will not,
in the long run, alter the main outlines of the welfare state.
Social purposes that can be achieved only through the
exercise of governmental authority will persist, and the

probl ms of defining areas of individual autonomy and
volition in a society in which state power is a salient fact
will continu to challeng and perplex us . Urging an
nlar d rol for voluntarism in areas in which state power
i now wield d does not imply an attachment to romantic
anarchistic assumptions that governmental coercion can be
wholl or largely eliminated . It is rather to invite new
att ntion lo th strate ies for according a substantial reality
lo individual volition in a society pervaded by claims of
o rnm ntal authority .
oluntaristic rehabilitative programs in the prisons may
contribut to a public thic governing the relations of the
slat to convict doff nders . The defining of such an ethic is
doubl important al a time like the present when popular
utra about widespread crime is approaching a climax. In
th b st of lim s the conditions of penal custod tend
toward waste , inhumanity, and brutality. At present a
variet y of conomic, ps chological, and cultural factors
lhr al nth serious exacerbation of the prison
n ironment. We need first to assert the human di nity of
thos we imprison and to stand against their
d humanization at our hands insofar as we are able . This
impli that however deplorable the wrongs done b the
pri on r, we as a society will not strip from him whatever
aspirations for self-improvement he ma retain, and that
we will suppl whatever assistance we can to advance the
achievement of his educational. vocational , or other selffulfilling goals .
Second, we need to refrain from imposing rehabilitative
goals and regimes upon him, and this not onl because past
efforts of this sort have largely failed, but also because to do
so is to infantilize adults . It is an ominous thin , one
basically incompatible with the assumption of liberal
societies, that the state should attempt through coercion to
invade the very mind and will of those held in its custod •.
In the past the radical incompatibilit of e ·treme
rehabilitationism with our basic political and moral values
was dis uised b the fact that the rehabilitati e techniques
emplo ed were fallible and such success as they achie ed
depended lar el on the oluntary efforts of the inmate . But
this will not alwa s be true; it is not holly true toda .. The
coerced application of dru s, ps chosur er , and other
forms of b ha ior modification in ade human personalit.
nd assault autonom , as do pro rams of "thou ht control "
practiced in totalitarian societies and in ome reli ious and
political cults within our o n communit . The moralit. of
means in these areas implicates our most fundamental
concerns .
These comments ha e been intended to su g st that at a
time like the present h n we are bein in ited to redefine
our social objecti es, it i of importance to i e particular
att ntion to how we propo e to achieve them . A Edna St.
Vine nt Milla . obser d man .. ears ago, the end cannot
land pur of the means . You will note that I ha e not
cha en to address question of constitutional ri hts and
limitation in thes r marks. 1uch of the morality of
m an , of course, is i en e pre ion in con titutional
doctrin ; but too often merican constitutionalism di erts
thou ht about social polic from needed consideration of its
rationalit and decenc . It is the concern ith means that i ,
parado icall , both the lory of the le al profes ion and the
basis for its bad r putation in the communit : it lor
b caus the alues that distinguish liberal societies from
oth rs oft n relate less to objecti es than to ho ends are
achi
d; bad reputation because a concern ith means
ma oft n gi e rise to complaints (some of them deser edj
of pettifo gin , excessive technicalit _, and obstructionism .
It is not surprisin that re olu tionar re imes, impatient to
er at th ir v rsions of the brave new world, ha e t picall
ought to d stro the legal professional or to minimize its

role . ot all of the law. er 's purposes are encompassed in
the moralit of means ; but we cannot fulfill our
commitments as la . ers and neglect its claims.
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